Classical Logic has played an important role as a normative system for psychologists investigating human reasoning. Psychological experiments, however, have shown that humans make assumptions, which are not necessarily valid, that they are influenced by their beliefs and that they reason non-monotonically. Instead of assuming that humans do not reason logically at all, we take the view that humans do not necessarily reason classical logically. As the area of human reasoning is versatile and complex, we focus on one aspect, namely on the question how to adequately model episodes of human reasoning with respect to conditionals in one formal approach. This report gives a brief summary of the key ideas and main findings of the doctoral dissertation in Dietz Saldanha EA (From logic programming to human reasoning: how to be artificially human. Volume 343 of Dissertations in Artif. Intell. (DISKI). Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft AKA GmbH, Berlin, 2018). For this purpose, we investigate whether the Weak Completion Semantics, a novel non-monotonic Logic Programming approach based on the three-valued Łukasiewicz Logic, adequately formalizes well-known human reasoning tasks. We are not aware of any other cognitive theory that has rigorously modeled such a wide range of tasks within one formalization. A surprising result is that this approach is competitive with other state-of-the-art cognitive theories in human syllogistic reasoning.
Introduction
Consider the following two syllogistic premises: Some bakers are artists. All chemists are bakers.
Experiments show that the majority of participants concluded, Some artists are chemists and Some chemists are artists necessarily follow from the premises above [1, 2] . However, classical logically No valid conclusion follows about the relation between artists and chemists. As illustrated by the gray highlighted areas of the Venn diagram in Fig. 1 , artists could be chemists or non-chemists, and vice versa.
This and other reasoning tasks (cf. [3, 4] ) confirm that humans do not reason according to Classical Logic, and hence logic-based approaches in general might not be suitable for understanding and modeling human reasoning. We are convinced that logic can help us to better understand why humans draw certain conclusions, but claim that it is the Classical Logic which is not adequate for this purpose.
The knowledge about human thinking in the area of Artificial Intelligence seems to be very limited, even though originally one of its objectives was the formalization of human reasoning and commonsense reasoning [5, 6] . Nonclassical logic approaches exist, however most of them are purely theoretical and are usually not applied to real case studies. Instead, artificial examples have been constructed, which only show that a theory works within a very specific context. But what is the value of a cognitive theory that has never been evaluated on the conclusions that humans actually draw? On the other hand, scientists from Cognitive Science have investigated human thinking extensively. They have a great expertise on biases that humans are exposed to and the presuppositions implied in natural language. However, their theories are usually not formalized, which makes them prone for ambiguous interpretations. An exchange among these areas would be a great opportunity for all involved parties: First, investigating current psychological results can help computer scientists to understand what human thinking is about. Second, formal techniques can offer the required tools to model the elaborated cognitive theories. Furthermore, according to [7] , AI tools and the investigations in human thinking can help people to make better decisions and communicate more effectively with machines. Eventually, these investigations might help to demonstrate reasoning failures and explain them by means of cognitive principles.
Stenning and van Lambalgen [8] proposed to model human reasoning by a two step procedure: first towards an appropriate representation (conceptual adequacy) and second with respect to that representation (inferential adequacy). The following section motivates the underlying formal approach. Thereafter, Sect. 3 discusses the representation of conditionals by specifying cognitive principles. Sect. 4 discusses different kinds of conditionals and suggests questions that need to be further explored. We conclude with the major contributions of [1] .
Weak Completion Semantics (WCS)
As adequate approach to model the suppression task [4] , a famous psychological experiment, [8] suggests logic programs under completion semantics based on a three-valued logic originally proposed by Kleene [9] . As shown by [10] , some technical claims in [8] are wrong and the approach is inadequate for modeling the suppression task. [10] provides an alternative approach, later called the Weak Completion Semantics (WCS), which considers the weak completion of logic programs under the three-valued Łukasiewicz logic [11] . Table 1 gives some common truth tables for negation, conjunction and disjunction. For implication and equivalence two different versions are shown: If both precondition and conclusion are mapped to U , the value of ← K ( ↔ K , resp.) is U , and the value of ← Ł ( ↔ Ł , resp.) is ⊤ . The conclusions drawn with respect to the least models of the weak completion of the programs correspond to the findings of the suppression task, and thus WCS seems to be adequate for modeling this task [10] . Additionally, [10] has shown that one of the advantageous technical properties of WCS is that least models always exist, which can be computed with a semantic operator developed in [8] . Least models are not guaranteed to exist when the underlying three-valued logic is the one used by [8] .
Cognitive Principles
Is WCS adequate for modeling human reasoning tasks in general? As demonstrated in [1] , various psychological experiments, such as the suppression task [4] , the selection task [3] , the belief-bias effect [12] , human spatial reasoning [13] and human syllogistic reasoning [2] seem to be adequately modeled under WCS. We specified cognitive principles, i.e. assumptions made by humans that are either motivated from findings in Cognitive Science, established techniques from Computer Science or own observations. Let's consider four of them:
1. Licenses for inferences [8] : A license for inference is introduced for every statement with help of an abnormality predicate: All chemists are bakers is replaced by All chemists that are not abnormal, are bakers and Nothing is abnormal (by default). 2. Existential import [14] : In natural language, humans do not quantify over things that do not exist, i.e. All chemists implies There exists (at least) one chemist. 3. Unknown generalization: According to Grice's [14] maxim of quantity, humans try to be as informative as required: Some bakers are artists implies that Not all bakers are artists, which in turn implies Some bakers are not artists. Additionally, even though in FOL Some bakers are artists is equivalent to Some artists are bakers, these statements are not necessarily equivalent for humans [2] . Table 1 Truth tables for (some) three-valued logics, where ⊤ , ⊥ , and U denote true, false, and unknown, respectively
The boxes highlighted in gray indicate the different interpretations between Łukasiewicz ( ← Ł , ↔ Ł ) and Kleene ( ← K , ↔ K )
We can take into account both observations by making use of the underlying three-valued logic: Some bakers are artists implies that there must not only be Some baker who is an artist, but there must also be Some baker(s), for who it is unknown whether they are artist(s). 4. Search for alternatives [15] : When participants cannot derive any conclusion straightforwardly, they might not want to accept this but instead check whether the given information can be explained. This principle is modeled by skeptical abduction [16] .
Consider again the premises from the introduction:
Some bakers are artists. All chemists are bakers.
A possible reason why Some artists are chemists and Some chemists are artists was concluded by participants, can intuitively be explained as follows: By principle 2, the first premise implies that some bakers exist. This can be explained by the second premise and principle 4, these bakers are chemists.
Evaluation System for Conditionals
Consider the following scenario [17] : President Kennedy was killed. There was a lengthy investigation about whether Oswald or somebody else shot the president. In the end, it was determined that Oswald did it. Which of the following conditionals do we easily accept?
1 Conditionals are statements of the form if condition then consequence. Indicative conditionals, e.g. (1), are conditionals whose condition may or may not be known to be true, and consequently, whose consequence also may or may not be true. Yet, the consequence is asserted to be true if the condition is true. On the other hand, the condition of a subjunctive or counterfactual conditional, e.g. (2), needs to be false [18] . Only in the counterfactual circumstance of the condition being true, the consequence is asserted to be true. 2 Consider again the example above: According to [17] , people easily accept (1) whereas they reject (2).
( In order to explore these questions, it is unavoidable to carry out reasoning experiments with humans. This task was beyond the scope of the dissertation.
Contributions and Conclusions
First, we showed the formal correspondence between WCS, the approach briefly introduced in Sect. 2, and other logic programming approaches [20] . We proposed an extension for contextual abductive reasoning [21] . After that we modeled various human reasoning tasks. The major achievement was in modeling syllogistic reasoning [22, 23] . For this purpose, we specified cognitive principles, some of them discussed in Sect. 3. Our results in [22] stand out, because the overall prediction had a match of 85% with the participants' conclusions. This was the best result compared to the predictions of the other theories reported in [2] .
Taking as starting point the questions suggested in Sect. 4, we formulated a hypothesis on how conditionals are evaluated in general. We believe that humans reason with a third truth value and proposed an evaluation system for conditionals and the evaluation strategy, minimal revision followed by abduction [24] , which seems to go along with [25] . Our approach is more general than the evaluation system for conditionals proposed in [26] .
Summing up, [1] will hopefully be a contribution to the paradigm shift from normative to descriptive theories for understanding and modeling episodes of human reasoning. We investigated and extended WCS and formalized cognitive principles within this approach. The goal of these principles was primarily to specify the assumptions made by humans, independent on their logical validity. Finally, we evaluated its cognitive adequacy by comparing our results to a wide range of human reasoning tasks. This approach is competitive with other state-of-the-art cognitive theories. The results are far from presenting a ultimate solution. Instead, [1] delivers a starting point and one possible path on bridging the gap among various scientific fields which might facilitate the communication between them in the future.
